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I. INTRODUCTION
Idaho's Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) will have a pro-
found influence on Idaho's future: the SRBA court is now in the proc-
ess of adjudicating the water right claims in nearly ninety percent of
the state.' Since most of the Snake River - the largest tributary of
the Columbia River - is located within Idaho, the SRBA will also
have a substantial effect on the entire Pacific Northwest. That effect
will not be limited to the region's human populations: fish and wildlife
will also be affected by the court's decisions. The stakes thus are high
not only for the state's agricultural and municipal diverters, but also
for federal lands' and Indian tribes - since federal and Indian re-
served water right claims are subject to state, basin-wide adjudica-
tion 3 - and for the Columbia Basin's resident and migratory popula-
tions of fish and wildlife.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College;
Co-Director, Northwest Water Law & Policy Project. This paper was written for the
project. Melissa Powers, second-year law student at Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis & Clark College, supplied able research assistance.
** Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.
*** Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
* AssociateIProfessor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law.
1. See THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ADJUDICATION REFERENCE 8 (Randy Stapilus
ed., 1999).
2. See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS 1998 Table 1-3 (1999) (reporting that the federal government owns
62.328% of the total acreage of the state).
3. See infra note 25.
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Thus far, the SRBA court has upheld federal stockwater claims
on Bureau of Land Management lands,4 allowed the United States
Forest Service to prove that maintenance of stream channels within
national forests requires instream flows, 5 and denied water rights for
the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge.' But the SRBA court has also
held that the federal government had a reserved water right to all of
the unappropriated water within three wilderness areas and to all of
the unappropriated water originating within the Hells Canyon Rec-
reation Area.7 The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the latter decision,8
prompting howls of protest from water diverters and an editorial in
The Idaho Statesman suggesting that the opinion's author should not
be reelected.' Federal reserved water rights are, to say the least, a
highly contentious issue in the state.
However contentious the issue of water rights for federal wilder-
ness areas is, reserved water rights for the Nez Perce Tribe loom even
larger. The tribe's claims are substantial in scope and early in time.
The Nez Perce Treaty of 1855"0 reserved a right to harvest fish at all
usual and accustomed places - many of which, such as Celilo Falls,
were not in the territory ceded by the tribe." This right was carefully
reserved in a subsequent treaty, and an agreement authorizing the
sale of "surplus lands" on the reservation never mentioned the tribe's
4. See In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 72-15929C (Idaho Dist. Ct., Apr. 15,
1998).
5. See In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 63-25243 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Dec. 22,
1998).
6. See In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 02-10063 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Dec.
31, 1998).
7. See In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 75-13316 (Idaho Dist. Ct., July
27, 1998).
8. See In re SRBA, No. 39576, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho, Oct. 1, 1999).
9. See Editorial, Idahoans Could Place Water Rights Issue in Their Hands,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 14, 1999, at 6B. See also Mark Warbis, Tempers run hot over
high court's recent rulings, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 13, 2000, at lB. The Statesman's
coverage has verged on hysteria from the beginning. The initial report on the case was
splashed across four columns on the front page and occupied nearly a full page in the
interior of the first section. The report was headlined: "Court ruling could siphon Ida-
hoans' water rights: If decision holds, thousands may lose water for homes, farming,
business." Rocky Barker, Court ruling could siphon Idahoans' water rights, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Oct. 10, 1999, at 1A.
10. The Nez Perce Treaty was entered into on June 11, 1855, but not ratified
by the U.S. Senate until 1859. See Treaty between the United States of America and
the Nez Perce Indians, June 11, 1855, 12 Stat. 957 (1859) [hereinafter Treaty of 1855].
11. The Nez Perce's pre-contact territory centered on the middle Snake and
Clearwater rivers and the northern portion of the Salmon River in what is now Idaho,
Oregon, and Washington. See Deward E. Walker, Nez Perce, in 12 HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICA INDIANS: PLATEAU 420, 421 (1998). Celilo Falls was located at the current site of
The Dalles, Oregon before it was inundated by The Dalles Dam.
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fishing rights." The reserved fishing right has been construed broadly
by the federal judiciary over the intervening century and a half: it has
been held to include a right of access even across private lands to
reach the accustomed fishing places," to prevent state regulations
that discriminate against tribal fishers, 4 and to include a share of
harvestable fish. 5 The tribe's claim is that it also necessarily includes
some amount of water, because fish need water.
Unlike wilderness water rights, which cannot have a priority
date before 1964, the tribe's priority date will be either the treaty date
or "time immemorial." Thus, the tribal rights will be the senior rights
throughout the Snake River Basin.'6 Moreover, because the Nez Perce
claims are located along the lower reaches of the Snake River in
Idaho, their early priority date could affect virtually every upstream
diverter in the state.
It is therefore understandable that the SRBA court's ruling on
the Nez Perce Tribe's off-reservation water rights was a much-
anticipated, even a dreaded decision. And the November 1999 deci-
sion, handed down by the SRBA's new presiding judge, Barry Wood,
while everything for which the water diverters could dare hope, con-
firmed the worst fears of the tribe and the federal government. 7 The
opinion entirely denied the existence of off-reservation water rights -
a startling departure from case law and the settled principles of In-
dian law jurisprudence. 18
This article examines the SRBA court's opinion on the Nez Perce
claims and its ramifications. Unfortunately, although Judge Wood ar-
ticulated the basis of reserved water rights law fairly accurately, he
misapplied that law at nearly every turn. In particular, the SRBA
court misunderstood the purpose of the 1855 Treaty with the Nez
12. See infra notes 68-70 (discussing express reservation of fishing rights in
1863 treaty) and 159 (noting the 1893 agreement's silence on fishing rights) and ac-
companying text.
13. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see also discussion
infra notes 37-39, 77-78, 86-87 and accompanying text.
14. See Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1973)
[hereinafter Puyallup III; see also discussion infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
15. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Ves-
sel Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979) [hereinafter Passenger Fishing Vessel]; see also discus-
sion infra notes 44-47, 70, 94-107 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1983)
(distinguishing treaty date reserved water rights for irrigation from "time immemo-
rial" reserved water rights for fish).
17. In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Nov. 10,
1999) [hereinafter Slip op.].
18. See id.
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Perce,"9 misconstrued a 1979 Supreme Court decision affirming the
tribe's treaty right to half of the harvestable salmon destined to pass
its historic fishing grounds, ° repeated errors made by the Idaho fed-
eral district court concerning the nature of the tribe's proprietary in-
terest,2' erroneously concluded that the tribe's reserved water rights
were limited to off-reservation fishing rights,2 and completely ignored
a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court decision that off-reservation rights are not
terminated by cession of "surplus" reservation lands to the federal
government. 23 For these and other reasons discussed below, the Nez
Perce decision should be reversed by the Idaho Supreme Court.
We begin with an explanation of Judge Wood's decision and his
reasoning. This explanation is followed by a discussion of: (1) the
flaws in the opinion's approach to determining the intent of the
treaty; (2) the court's misinterpretation of a 1979 Supreme Court de-
cision upholding the Nez Perce treaty fishing right; (3) its failure to
comprehend treaty fishing as a property right; (4) the cases which in-
dicate that the tribe's water right is not limited to on-reservation
lands; and (5) the SRBA court's disregard of the Supreme Court's
1999 ruling that off-reservation usufructuary rights are not termi-
nated by land cessions to the federal government. Finally, we con-
clude that the SRBA decision fails to justify the confidence that Jus-
tice Brennan expressed in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,24 that
state courts, operating pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, could
faithfully and fairly apply the law of federal reserved water rights to
Indian tribes that are unwillingly subjected to state jurisdiction.2 5
19. Article 3 of the Treaty of 1855 provides: 'The exclusive right of taking fish
in all the streams where running through or bordering said reservation is further se-
cured to said Indians, as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed
places in common with citizens of the Territory .... Treaty of 1855, 12 Stat. 957, 958
(1859).
20. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
21. See Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994);
see also discussion infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
22. See infra Part VI.
23. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999); see also discussion infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
24. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
25. See id. at 571. See also Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1953,
ch. 495, 66 Stat. 556, 570 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994)). The McCarran Amend-
ment was a rider to the Act, waiving the federal government's sovereign immunity in
state suits determining the water rights of all users in a basin. See Michael C. Blumm,
Reserved Water Rights, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37.04(a)(1), at 273 (Robert
E. Beck ed., 1996).
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II. THE SRBA COURT DECISION
The November 1999 decision reflected a basic understanding of
the concept of reserved rights and the canons of treaty interpreta-
tion,2" but failed to apply those principles to the Nez Perce claim. The
court noted that the tribe's water rights spring not from a land reser-
vation by the federal government, but from rights the tribe reserved
in lands ceded to the federal government.27 Most courts recognizing
this distinction have concluded that a tribe's reservation of pre-
existing rights in a treaty creates a 'time immemorial" right.2" Judge
Wood, however, departed from this rule by holding that the reserved
treaty right to fish on ceded lands had no accompanying water right.2"
The court apparently concluded that, in order for water to be re-
served, it had to be implied in a reservation of land. Since the tribe
ceded the land, no water was reserved, according to this view.30 The
fact that the Nez Perce treaty expressly reserved off-reservation
treaty fishing rights, and that these rights were central to the bargain
that induced the tribe to convey some 6.5 million acres of land to the
United States,31 was not significant in the court's opinion. The only
26. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 24-27. On January 21, 2000, Judge Wood
reaffirmed his November 10 opinion in response to a federal request to amend the ear-
lier judgment. See In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022, (Idaho Dist. Ct.,
Jan. 21, 2000). Following Judge Wood's decision, the United States moved to alter or
amend the judgment to clarify that the grant of summary judgment did not include a
ruling on the diminishment of the Nez Perce Reservation, or in the alternative, to al-
low the government the opportunity to submit testimony and documentary evidence on
the diminishment issue. See id. at 1-2. The SRBA court denied both motions. See id. at
29. Despite his admission that a ruling on diminishment was not necessary to a de-
termination of whether the Nez Perce Tribe reserved off-reservation water rights to
support its fishery, Judge Wood nonetheless insisted that the finding of diminishment
was not dicta. See id. at 6-7. In addition, the court held that because it had "read and
reviewed a significant amount of historical documents included in the affidavits sub-
mitted by the various counsel," there was no reason to afford the government an evi-
dentiary hearing on the issue, id. at 12, despite the government's assertion that it did
not understand that diminishment was a question properly before the court on the mo-
tions for summary judgment. See id. at 6.
27. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 38.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983); Joint
Bd. of Control of the Flathead, Mission & Jocko Irrig. Dists. v. United States, 832 F.2d
1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1987); See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Aamodt, 618 F. Supp. 993,
1009 (D.N.M. 1985); Globe Equity Decree at 86, United States v. Gila River Irrig. Dist.,
No. 59 (D. Ariz., June 29, 1935) (cited in Blumm, supra note 25, § 37.02(b), at 241
n.168); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985); Washington v. Acquavella, No. 77-2-
01484-5, at 61 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Oct. 22, 1990).
29. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 38.
30. See id. at 39-40.
31. See id. at 17. In the 1863 Treaty of Lapwai, ratified by the Senate in 1867,
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point that seemed to matter to the court was that these were off-
reservation rights. Since Judge Wood declared that the reserved
rights doctrine was restricted to reservation lands, he denied the
tribe's off-reservation water claims.
3 2
The decision also relied heavily on Judge Wood's repeated asser-
tion that the treaty negotiators intended no reservation of water when
they reserved the fishing right."3 The SRBA court seemed to require a
specific intent to reserve water - precisely the kind of intent that the
Supreme Court did not require when it established the reserved water
rights doctrine in Winters v. United States,' and has not required
since. Instead, the Supreme Court has looked to the purposes of the
treaty and has asked whether water is necessary to satisfy those pur-
poses.3 5 In Winters, for example, the Court implied a reservation of
water in the intent to create a new agricultural way of life for the
tribe - not because the treaty itself contained any evidence of direct
intent to reserve water.3 1 In United States v. Winans s7 a contempora-
neous Supreme Court decision construing the fishing right in another
Stevens Treaty,38 the Court followed a similar reasoning although the
treaty revealed no specific intent to reserve easements across land to
reach fishing places, the Court had no difficulty implying such ease-
ments based on the treaty's intent to preserve a way of life that cen-
tered on fishing.
39
the tribe ceded an additional 6 million acres of land to the United States, but again re-
served its fishing rights. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Nez
Perce Tribe, June 9, 1863, 14 Stat. 647 (1867).
32. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 40, 47.
33. See id. at 27, 30-32, 37.
34. 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908); see also Blumm, supra note 25, § 37.01(b)(2), at
225.
35. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
36. Noting the importance of the Fort Belknap Treaty to the decision in the
case, the Court wrote:
The reservation was a part of a very much larger tract which the Indians had
the right to occupy and use and which was adequate for the habits and wants
of a nomadic and uncivilized people. It was the policy of the Government, it
was the desire of the Indians, to change those habits and become a pastoral
and civilized people. If they should become such the original tract was too ex-
tensive, but a smaller tract would be inadequate without a change of condi-
tions. The lands were arid and, without irrigation, were practically valueless.
And yet, it is contended, the means of irrigation were deliberately given up by
the Indians and deliberately accepted by the Government.
Id. at 576.
37. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
38. See Treaty between the United States of America and the Yakama Tribe,
June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).
39. See id. at 381.
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The simple fact that the Stevens treaties sought to preserve a
way of life centered on fishing - and that fish need water - failed to
impress the SRBA court. According to the court, the purpose of the
Nez Perce Treaty was instead to open up lands for settlement.40 As a
result, it would "defly] reason to imply the existence of a water right
that was both never intended by the parties and inconsistent with the
purpose of the Treaty."' Therefore, the SRBA court stated, it was "in-
conceivable that either the United States or the Tribe intended or
even contemplated that the Tribe would remain in control of the wa-
ter." 2 The court refused to interpret the treaty to protect the water
flows necessary for fish habitat because "at some point only so many
interpretations can be exacted from the Treaty language. It is also a
canon of treaty interpretation that Indian treaties cannot be rewritten
or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice." 3
The SRBA court claimed support for this restrictive interpreta-
tion in what it considered to be the "settled legal meaning" of the Su-
preme Court's most recent interpretation of the Stevens treaties: the
1979 decision in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n." Judge Wood supported his conclusion by
noting that nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion indicated that the
treaty right entitled the tribes to more than an access to their historic
fishing grounds or a proportionate share of the fish harvests.4" This
interpretation is an example of the inconsistencies that plague the de-
cision. For example, the SRBA court saw no problem in stating, on
one hand, that "because of the abundance of fish at the time the
treaty was executed, neither party to the treaty contemplated a need
for future regulation or allocation," 6 while in other parts of its opinion
also acknowledging that the Supreme Court had previously sanc-
tioned state regulation, and had held that the treaties implicitly allo-
cated a share of the harvest.4 7 Judge Wood offered no explanation for
40. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 38 ('The purpose of the Stevens Treaties
was to resolve the conflict which arose between the Indians and the non-Indian set-
tlers as a result of the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 which vested title to land in set-
tlers .... [O]ne of the admitted purposes of the Treaty was to extinguish aboriginal title
to make the lands available for settlement ..
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 39 (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,
432 (1943)).
44. Id. at 30 (relying on Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)).
45. See id. at 31-33. The court also thought it significant that the proportion-
ate harvest share that the Supreme Court found implied in the Stevens treaties was
phrased in terms of a maximum rather than a minimum share. See id. at 31.
46. Id. at 31.
47. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 677-78, 682, 686 (noting a 50
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these results in light of the lack of intent that he found determinative
on the water right issue.
Also central to the SRBA court's decision was its conclusion that
the treaty created no property rights. This result obtained, in Judge
Wood's view, because the treaty guaranteed the tribe only a propor-
tionate harvest share, not "an absolute right to a predetermined or
consistent level of fish."' The fluctuating nature of the fishery, the
court reasoned, rendered the harvest right inherently uncertain and
made it unnecessary to imply a reserved water right to maintain the
fish.49
The SRBA court emphasized the limited nature of the treaty
fishing right by noting two points: first, that state conservation regu-
lations may curtail the scope of the harvest right;50 second, that an
earlier decision by the federal district court of Idaho had concluded
that the Nez Perce Tribe had no ownership rights in fish as a result of
the treaty - thus permitting Idaho Power Company to operate the
dams that destroyed fishing sites and fish without paying damages.51
The SRBA court distinguished the several cases in which courts
have implied water rights to fulfill the fishing purpose of a treaty,
statute, or executive order,52 as either on-reservation cases or as cases
not implicating the Stevens treaties' "fishing in common" language.53
Even apart from a factual error,' and the fact that another case did
indeed involve fishing rights that survived the termination of a reser-
vation and were thus were no longer appurtenant to reservation
lands,55 reserving off-reservation water to fulfill an implied agricul-
tural purpose" hardly seems more compelling than reserving off-
reservation water to fulfill an express, bargained-for fishing right.
percent harvest share); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398
(1968) [hereinafter Puyallup I]; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942)
(authorizing state regulation of the treaty right).
48. Slip op., supra note 17, at 33. The court's line of reasoning suggested that
water rights also are not property rights because - as with fish - the fluctuating na-
ture of the resource precludes "an absolute right to a predetermined or consistent
[amount of water]." Id.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 34-35.
51. See id. at 34-37 (citing Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp.
791 (D. Idaho 1994)).
52. See cases cited supra note 28. The Aamodt and Gila River cases involved
reserved water rights for irrigation rather than fish.
53. Slip op., supra note 17, at 39.
54. One of the cases the court attempted to distinguish did involve the Stev-
ens treaty "in common" language and an off-reservation right. See Kittitas Reclama-
tion Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrig. Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985); see also infra
note 154.
55. See United States v. Adair, 694 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-96, 600-01 (1963).
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Finally, the SRBA court's decision rested on a conclusion that an
1893 agreement - incorporated into an 1894 statute, in which the Nez
Perce agreed to a '"present and total surrender of all tribal interests"'
except as reserved by the agreement - eliminated any possibility of
reserved water rights.57 According to the court, under the Supreme
Court's 1998 decision in South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,5" the
1893 agreement had the effect of diminishing the boundaries of the
Nez Perce reservation.5 9 The court viewed this "diminishment" as sig-
nificant - even though the Yankton Sioux case concerned a question
of tribal sovereignty' rather than a property right - because of the
court's earlier determination that only reserved lands possessed re-
served water rights." Therefore, according to the court, the dimin-
ishment of the reservation eliminated reserved water rights - even
though the 1893 agreement contained a savings clause in which the
tribe had retained its off-reservation fishing rights, the legal basis for
its reserved water rights. 2 The court made no mention of the Su-
preme Court's more recent decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band
of Chippewa Indians,3 in which the Court held that reserved off-
reservation hunting and fishing rights survived an unconditional ces-
sion of lands quite similar to the 1893 agreement with the Nez
Perce. 64
Judge Wood's decision therefore denied the existence of any wa-
ter rights appurtenant to the Nez Perce Tribe's off-reservation fishing
grounds. Although he did not decide the tribe's on-reservation water
claims,65 those claims would disturb few state water rights. The tribe's
off-reservation claims, however, involve the Snake River, implicating
nearly all state-granted water rights in Idaho. If upheld on appeal,
the opinion will lift a cloud on water titles that threatened most water
development in the state. Although the result is what every water de-
veloper in the state had hoped for, the SRBA court's opinion should
not survive an appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.
57. Slip op., supra note 17, at 44 (quoting Articles I-III of the 1893 Nez Perce
agreement).
58. 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
59. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 46 (relying on Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329).
60. The tribal sovereignty issue in Yankton Sioux involved the tribe's ability to
regulate a landfill on what it thought was reservation lands. Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S.. at
333.
61. Slip op., supra note 17, at 39-40.
62. See id. at 46.
63. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
64. See id.
65. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 12, 40, 46, 47.
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III. THE PURPOSE OF THE NEZ PERCE TREATY
According to Judge Wood, the purpose of the Stevens Treaties,
including the Nez Perce treaty, "was to resolve the conflict which
arose between the Indians and the non-Indian settlers as a result of
the Oregon Donation Act of 1850 which vested title to land in set-
tlers." Although this may indeed have been one intent of the United
States negotiators, a treaty is the product of the intent of at least two
parties, and rules of Indian treaty interpretation counsel that "Indian
treaties must be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have
understood them.6
The intent of the tribes in the negotiations leading to the Stevens
Treaties was to reserve a homeland and off-reservation hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights. 8 This was also clearly the intent of
Governor Stevens himself. At the Treaty of Point No Point, another
1855 treaty containing reservations of similar hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights, he stated:
Are you not my children and also children of the [GIreat Fa-
ther? What will I not do for my children and what will you not
do for yours? Would you not die for them? This paper is such
as a man would give to his children and I will tell you why.
This paper gives you a home. Does not a father give his chil-
dren a home? This paper you a school[.] Does not a father
send his children to school? It gives you mechanics and a Doc-
tor to teach and cure you. Is that not fatherly? This paper se-
cures your fish[.] Does not a father give food to his children?
Besides fish you can hunt, gather roots and berries.
69
The Supreme Court relied on statements like Governor Stevens'
when it concluded in 1979 that "[it is perfectly clear ... that the In-
dians were vitally interested in protecting their right to take fish at
usual and accustomed places . . and that they were invited by the
white negotiators to rely and in fact did rely heavily on the good faith
66. Id. at 38.
67. Id. at 25, (citing Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979)); see
also Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196 (citing the canons of construction).
68. See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit
and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 407, 426-33 (1998).
69. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DIv. OF FORESTRY & GRAZING, U.S. DEPT. OF
THE INTERIOR, REPORT ON THE SOURCE, NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE FISHING,
HUNTING, AND MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS OF CERTAIN INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON
AND OREGON 348 (July 1942) (compiled by Edward G. Swindell, Jr., later Regional So-
licitor, Department of the Interior) (emphasis added).
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of the United States to protect that right."'7 Not surprisingly, the
SRBA court ignored the statements of both Governor Stevens and the
Supreme Court.
Instead, the court chose to emphasize the treaty purpose of ex-
tinguishing aboriginal title, while ignoring the rights the tribes re-
served in the treaty in exchange for conveying 6.5 million acres of
their land.71 Consequently, the court decided that it was 'inconceiv-
able that either the United States or the Tribe intended or even con-
templated that the Tribe would remain in control of the water." 2 The
SRBA court's skepticism was a consequence of its apparent belief that
the treaty's purpose was to enable lands "to be developed and irri-
gated by non-Indian settlers."' This purpose appears nowhere in the
treaty or in the treaty negotiations, however, and the court did not
cite any authority for this non-Indian irrigation treaty purpose. In-
deed, no other court has ever interpreted the purpose of an Indian
treaty to include the promotion of non-Indian irrigation. Under the
reserved rights doctrine, water is reserved to fulfill the purposes of
the treaty for the benefit of the tribes. Non-Indian purposes are thus
irrelevant to the reserved rights doctrine.7"
Ultimately, Judge Wood's approach contradicted one of the most
settled principles of Indian law: rights not expressly granted in a
treaty are reserved to the Indians.7 5 The SRBA court instead turned
the reserved rights doctrine on its head by interpreting the treaty as a
relinquishment of water rights on the ground that there was no ex-
pressly evidenced intent to reserve a water right.76 This interpretation
fundamentally shifted the burden of demonstrating reserved tribal
rights and is contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in United States
v. Winans.77 As the Supreme Court stated in interpreting the Stevens
fishing clause to allow implied access over private lands to usual and
accustomed fishing sites:
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a
part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exer-
70. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 667.
71. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 38-39.
72. Id. at 38.
73. Id.
74. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976) (rejecting a 'bal-
ancing of competing interests" test for determining the existence of reserved water rights
in favor of governmental intent to reserve unappropriated waters).
75. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. See also FELIX S. COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (1982).
76. Slip op., supra note 17, at 37.
77. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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cise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and
which were not much less necessary to the existence of the
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.... Only a limita-
tion of [those aboriginal rights], however, was necessary and
intended, not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was
not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from
them - a reservation of those not granted.
Given the amount of land received by the United States in the
Stevens treaties, the determination of the tribes to reserve their fish-
ing livelihoods, and the rule of interpretation - recognized but ig-
nored by the SRBA court 79 - that any rights not expressly granted by
the tribes to the United States are retained by them, it is not clear
how the court could conclude that "it defies reason" to imply the exis-
tence of reserved water necessary to maintain their fishing rights.8'
Nor is it clear why the court thought the alleged scope of the water
right - which the court recognized was beyond the scope of its deci-
sion"' - was relevant to the question of whether there was an implied
water right for fish. Yet the court believed that pointing out the po-
tential scope of the right was "helpful" in determining its existence,82
perhaps so that the Idaho and United States Supreme Courts would
not miss the point . In this respect, the court's opinion resembles an
advocate's brief more than a dispassionate judicial opinion.
IV. THE MEANING OF THE PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL
DECISION
Judge Wood's opinion recognized that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Passenger Fishing Vessel was critical to the Nez Perce water
rights claim. He acknowledged the Supreme Court's determination
that the fishing provision of the treaties was of "vital importance" to
all of the Stevens Treaty tribes.8 " He also noted that the parties to the
treaties never contemplated that the treaty fishing right
would be impeded by subsequent technology (fishing wheels),
property law concepts (right of access), or regulation (conser-
vation laws) at the time the treaty was being negotiated.
Likewise, the parties to the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty did not in-
tend to reserve an instream flow water right because neither
78. Id. at 381; see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 444.
79. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 24.
80. See id. at 38.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 31 (citing Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 667 (1979)).
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party to the Treaty contemplated a problem would arise in the
future pertaining to fish habitat.'
What Judge Wood did not acknowledge, however, was that, despite
this lack of specific intent, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled
that the treaties protect tribal fishing against new technologies, prop-
erty law concepts, and state regulations.8 5 In short, the lack of specific
intent which the SRBA court found decisive on the water right claim
has been treated as irrelevant by the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Winans,8 the Court determined that the
treaty fishing right included an implied right of access across pri-
vately owned lands as well as a right to fish at historic fishing
grounds despite the state's grant of a license giving monopoly rights
to operate a fishwheel" In Seufort Brothers v. United States," the
Court extended the Winans holding to lands that had not been ceded
in the relevant treaty."9 In Tulee v. Washington,90 the Court exempted
tribal harvesters from state license fees.9 1 And in Puyallup v. Depart-
ment of Game (Puyallup II),9" the Court held that facially nondis-
criminatory state conservation regulations would be illegal if they in
fact impermissibly discriminated against tribal fishing.93
Thus, at the time the dispute in Passenger Fishing Vessel
reached the Supreme Court, the treaty fishing right had been inter-
preted to include an implied affirmative easement to access historical
fishing grounds (even across private property) and a negative servi-
tude preventing a state from burdening tribal harvests with license
fees or discriminatory regulations." In Passenger Fishing Vessel, the
Supreme Court went a significant step further: the Justices deter-
mined that implied in the treaty fishing right was an affirmative right
to harvest up to fifty percent of the available fish.95 Noting that the
treaties promised the tribes something more than a right to dip their
nets into the territorial waters and come up empty, the Court rea-
84. Id. at 32-33.
85. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 68, at 435-62 (discussing cases).
86. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
87. Id. at 381.
88. 249 U.S. 194 (1919).
89. Id. at 198-99.
90. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
91. Id. at 681.
92. 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
93. Id. (clarifying the rule laid down in Puyallup I, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968),
where the Court held that the state could regulate the treaty in the interest of conser-
vation, provided that the regulation did not discriminate against tribal harvests).
94. See supra notes 86-93.
95. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 658, 686 (1979).
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soned that, without this apportionment, the state could impermissibly
regulate fishing to crowd out the tribes from their reserved fishery.96
Thus, the Supreme Court's decisions have consistently expanded the
servitude implied in the treaties in order to fulfill the overriding pur-
pose of protecting the tribes' right to fish. 97
The SRBA court ignored this history, stating that "[n]owhere in
[Passenger Fishing Vessel] is a water or other property right greater
than an access or allocation right mentioned for purposes of giving ef-
fect to the fishing right... ."' In other words, the court reasoned that
because the Supreme Court had not determined that the fishing right
included an implied water right, it would refuse to acknowledge such
a right. The Supreme Court, however, had not been presented with
any water rights issues."9 Therefore, when the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the scope of the fishing right in Passenger Fishing Vessel, its
review was limited to the allocation issue; neither the remaining
hatchery or environmental issues were before the Court. In fact, the
Supreme Court affirmatively declined to review issues which had
been reserved for decision in the trial court. °0 The SRBA court's ap-
96. See id. at 678-79 ("Because the Indians had always exercised the right to
meet their subsistence and commercial needs by taking fish ... they would be unlikely
to perceive a 'reservation' of that right as merely the chance, shared with millions of
other citizens, occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial waters.")
97. See supra notes 86-93, 95-96.
98. Slip op., supra note 17, at 33.
99. As originally filed, the United States v. Washington litigation included
three sets of issues: (1) whether the treaty fishing clause entitled the tribes to a spe-
cific allocation of fish (the "allocation" issue); (2) whether, if allocation were required,
hatchery fish were included within the allocation (the "hatchery" issue); and (3)
whether the right to take fish includes a right to have treaty fish protected from envi-
ronmental degradation (the "environmental" issue, which includes the water rights is-
sue). See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 190 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
[hereinafter Washington Phase II] (describing the litigation which originally had com-
menced in 1970).
The parties agreed to litigate the case in two phases. The first phase in-
volved only the allocation issue and eventually resulted - after a series of related trial
and appellate court decisions - in the Supreme Court's Passenger Fishing Vessel deci-
sion. See id. at 191; see also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 328 (W.D.
Wash. 1974) [hereinafter Washington Phase 1] (approving parties stipulation to defer
environmental issues until after trial on the allocation issue). Washinton Phase II in-
volved the hatchery and environmental issues which had been reserved for litigation
in the trial court until after the final resolution of Washington Phase I allocation is-
sues. See Washington Phase I1, 506 F. Supp. at 191.
100. See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 689 n.30. The Court stated:
Although there is some discussion in the briefs concerning whether the trea-
ties give Indians the same right to take hatchery-bred fish as they do to take
native fish, the District Court has not yet reached a final decision on the is-
sue, and it is not therefore fairly subsumed within our grant of certiorari.
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proach of considering a case as binding authority on an issue it did
not even address represents a novel method of applying precedent -
one which offends accepted jurisprudence and depletes the precedent
of any meaning.
The SRBA court also placed great emphasis on the fact that the
Passenger Fishing Vessel Court established the fifty percent harvest
share as a maximum rather than a minimum. For the court, this
meant that the "fishing right is a limited, rather than an absolute
guarantee or entitlement."10 1 Because Judge Wood found that
"[i]mplicit in the [Supreme Court's] ruling is the recognition the fish
runs will vary or even be subject to shortages," he concluded that a
water right was unnecessary "for maintenance of fish habitat or fish
propagation."10 2 In short, since there was no assurance of a specific
amount of fish, there was no assurance of any fish or fish habitat at
all. One could use this same reasoning to deny the existence of virtu-
ally all water rights in the state, since precipitation, an inherently
uncertain event, is a prerequisite to the exercise of a water right.
Moreover, this interpretation is another distortion of Passenger
Fishing Vessel. The fifty percent maximum allocation resulted solely
from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the treaty language re-
serving to the Indians the "right of taking fish"' in common "with 'all
citizens of the Territory."'1 3 The allocation reflected no assumption by
the Supreme Court that fish habitat is unprotected by the treaty. And
while the SRBA court emphasized naturally occurring fluctuations in
fish runs to justify its conclusion that there can be no assurances of
actual numbers of returning fish - and from there leapt to the fur-
ther conclusion that there could be no legal protection for fish habitat
-'the Supreme Court in Passenger Fishing Vessel actually empha-
sized the stability of fish runs. 4 As the Supreme Court noted at the
beginning of the opinion:
The regular habits of these fish make their "runs" predictable;
this predictability in turn makes it possible for both fisherman
and regulators to forecast and to control the number of fish
that will be caught or "harvested." Indeed, . . . the manage-
ment of anadromous fisheries is in many ways more akin to
the cultivation of "crops" - with its relatively high degree of
Id. (citations omitted).
101. Slip op., supra note 17, at 31.
102. Id. at 33.
103. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 677-79 (quoting the treaty lan-
guage).
104. Id. at 663.
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predictability and productive stability, subject mainly to sud-
den changes in climatic patterns - than is the management
of most other commercial and sports fisheries." 5
Further, the Court highlighted the stability of runs as important
to the context against which the Stevens Treaty language should be
interpreted. In construing the treaty language reserving the "right of
taking fish," the Court pointed out:
This language is particularly meaningful in the context of
anadromous fisheries... because of the relative predictability
of the "harvest." In this context, it makes sense to say that a
party has a right to 'take" - rather than merely the "oppor-
tunity" to try to catch - some of the large quantities of fish
that will almost certainly be available at a given place at a
given time.' °6
Moreover, the SRBA court ignored the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the overriding purpose of the treaties. As the Supreme Court
noted,"the central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to
a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited
by the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood - that is to say, a moderate
living."'0 7 Thus, the overarching purpose of the treaties is to provide
the tribes with a fishing livelihood. The Supreme Court has inter-
preted treaties to include affirmative access rights, negative rights
against state fees and discriminatory regulations, and affirmative
harvest-share rights to effectuate this purpose. It is difficult to fathom
a fishing right existing without water to supply the fish with habitat
to spawn, rear, and migrate.
V. THE TREATY FISHING RIGHT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
The SRBA court's determination that the treaty fishing right is
not an absolute entitlement, but instead is "essentially a right to a
share of the fish harvest ... [rather than a] guarantee to a set amount
of fish," coupled with its recognition that the right is subject to state
conservation regulations, led it to conclude that "[t]he Nez Perce do
not have a property interest in the fish."'0 8 This conclusion repeats an
error made by the Idaho federal district court that the SRBA court ac-
cepted as authoritative.0 9
105. Id.
106. Id. at 678.
107. Id. at 686.
108. Slip op., supra note 17, at 37.
109. See id. at 35-37 (relying on Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F.
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In Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., ° the federal district court
concluded that, because the tribe had no ownership rights in any in-
dividual fish in a salmon run, it had no "property" entitling it to com-
pensation for damages caused by the construction or operation of
Idaho Power's three dams in the Hells Canyon reach of the Snake
River.11' The court claimed that the tribe's treaty fishing rights were
not property rights because the tribe only has "an opportunity to catch
fish if they are present at the accustomed fishing grounds.""' 2 The Su-
preme Court, however, has rejected the notion that the treaties gave
the tribes only an opportunity to attempt to harvest fish on a non-
discriminatory basis. The Court ruled in Passenger Fishing Vessel
that the treaty right was more than 'merely the chance ... occasion-
ally to dip their nets into the territorial waters.""' 3Tribal fishing rights are, indisputably, property rights."4 In
1968, in Menominee Tribe v. United States, "' the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the notion that treaty fishing rights are property rights by
noting that their termination would require payment of constitution-
ally mandated 'Just compensation" by the government." 6 Further,
nearly a century ago in the Winans case, the Court described the
treaty right as a "servitude" - a "right in the land" burdening "every
piece of land" ceded by the tribes in the Stevens Treaties."' This is
the quintessence of a property right, giving the tribes the right to oc-
cupy and make use of lands despite the "contingency of future owner-
ship." 1 8 It was an attempt to avoid the Menominee Tribe precedent
that led the Idaho federal district court to attempt to distinguish the
Menominee Tribe's fishing rights - recognized by the Supreme Court
Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994)).
110. 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994).
111. The tribe sought compensation under section 10(c) of the Federal Power
Act. Section 10(c) makes federal licensees, such as Idaho Power Company, "liable for
all damages... to the property of others" caused by the construction, maintenance, or
operation of their projects. 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (1994).
112. NezPerce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 795.
113. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 679 (1979).
114. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968); see also
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1510 (W.D. Wash. 1988) ("The
Tribes' right to take fish is a property right.'); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d
658, 663 (Cl. Ct. 1961) (holding that tribal fishing rights are communally owned prop-
erty rights); COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 75, at 468 ("The Supreme Court has
stated that Indian Treaty hunting and fishing rights are valuable property rights."
(citing cases)).
115. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
116. Id. at 413.
117. Winans v. United States, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
118. Id.
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as property rights - from the Nez Perce Tribe's fishing rights, which
the district court called merely treaty rights - perhaps entitling the
tribe to compensation only from the government, but not from private
parties like Idaho Power.1 9 It is hard to believe that this contrived
distinction would have survived an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, but
the case was settled before the appeal was decided.1
20
Part of the property right recognized by the Supreme Court in
Winans and Menominee Tribe consists of a profit . prendre - the
right to go on land owned by another and remove a natural re-
source.' 2' A right to take fish is a piscary profit d prendre - an inter-
est the common law has for centuries recognized as a- property
right.122 Further, the common law has long permitted parties with
hunting and fishing rights to restrain those who damage these
rights.12 For example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently en-
119. See Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 795-96.
120. The settlement called for Idaho Power to pay the tribe some $16.5 million,
$11.5 of which was allocated to the settlement of the case, and $5 million of which was
for the tribe's "full support" of Idaho Power's relicensing of the three hydroelectric
projects that make up the Hells Canyon Complex, payable after the successful reli-
censing. See Settlement Agreement between the Nez Perce and Idaho Power Company
at 6, Nez.Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. 791. Subsequent to the Nez Perce Tribe decision,
the Ninth Circuit ruled that privately owned shellfish beds were subject to the treaty
fishing right, undermining the federal district court of Idaho's key assumption that the
treaty fishing right did not burden private property. See United States v. Washington,
157 F.3d 630, 646-47 (9th Cir. 1998).
121. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES xxi (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1989) ("A profit creates the right to enter on and remove a physical substance
from land in the possession of another. It imposes a duty on the owner and possessor of
the land not to interfere with "removal of the substance."); see also 8 THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY § 65.01(a), at 33-34 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994); 3 HERBERT
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 839, at 427 (3d ed. 1939) ("A profit
A prendre involves primarily a power to acquire, by severance or removal from
anothers land, some thing or things previously constituting a part of the land .... ).
122. See 8 THOMPSON, supra note 121, § 65.02(b), at 38 (listing piscary profits
as one of the four principal kinds of common law profits); see also TIFFANY, supra note
121, § 839, at 427-28 (classifying the right to fish as a profit). Piscary profits 'a prendre
were not unusual in common law England. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *34; see also Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 562 (1916) ("We assume
that [the Seneca] retained an easement [to hunt and fish], or a profit a prendre, to the
extent defined [in the Treaty of the Big Tree of 1797] .... "); Lac Courte Oreilles Band
of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 352 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Finch, 548 F.2d 822, 833 (9th Cir. 1977) (ruling by Judge, now Justice, Ken-
nedy recognizing that the treaty fishing right could be characterized as a profit d pren-
dre); Van Camp v. Menominee Enters., Inc., 228 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (Wis. 1975) (rec-
ognizing a treaty right to hunt and fish as a profit d prendre); Grand Traverse Band of
Chippewa & Ottawa Indians v. Director, Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 971 F.
Supp. 282, 288 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that treaty rights to fish are profits d pren-
dre, constitutionally protected property rights).
123. See, e.g., Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (Q.B. 1707)
(ruling that the owner of a duck pond had a cause of action against another who drove
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joined a development that would have destroyed hunting habitat on
land subject to a recreational hunting profit d prendre.124 The Nez
Perce piscary profit - the purpose of which, the Supreme Court con-
cluded, was to supply tribal members with a livelihood, 125 and which
was the essential consideration for one of the largest real estate
transactions in United States history - would seem to warrant no
less judicial protection than a recreational hunting profit.
The SRBA court's suggestion that the tribe did not possess a
property right because the state could regulate tribal fishing, while
the tribe could not regulate non-tribal fishing, 26 is a curious bit of
whimsy but hardly a reason that justifies the court's conclusion. State
regulation of property rights for conservation purposes is common-
place.127 In fact, it is hard to conceive of a property right that is not
subject to such regulation. This does not mean that property rights do
not exist, only that they are subject to regulation. Additionally, the
fact that the tribes cannot regulate non-tribal fish harvests, while
true, adds nothing to the argument: 21 the SRBA court confused the
authority to regulate - a sovereign power - with the right to fish -
a proprietary right. Whether the tribe has the sovereign power to
regulate non-Indian water rights is simply irrelevant to the existence
of its property rights.
Finally, like the federal district court of Idaho, Judge Wood re-
fused to recognize the treaty fishing right as a property interest be-
cause he thought that doing so would provide the tribe with "an ab-
solute right to the preservation of the fish runs in their original 1855
away ducks with gunfire because "he that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is
liable'; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing an action
by commercial fishers against oil companies for damages resulting from an oil spill);
see also Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal
Property Rights?, 17 PuB. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REv. 153, 162-67 (1996) (collecting
other cases).
124. See Figluizzi v. Carcajou Shooting Club, 516 N.W.2d 410, 417-18 (Wis.
1994) (enjoining a four-building, 26-unit condominium complex for constituting an un-
reasonable interference with a hunting and fishing profit d prendre possessed by nine-
teen members of a hunting club).
125. See id.
126. Slip op., supra note 17, at 34-35.
127. See 8 THOMPSON, supra note 121, § 75, at 423-573 (discussing in detail the
effect of environmental regulation on real property); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 1135 (1988) ("The scope of land use regulation
by federal, state and local governments is enormous.'.
128. Indeed, state conservation regulation was a principal reason the Supreme
Court declared that implied in the treaty fishing right was a harvest-share right of up
to 50 percent, See Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979) (stating that one
sovereign government with the authority to allocate harvests affecting two sovereigns
was inherently unfair).
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condition, free from all environmental damage." '129 Instead, the SRBA
court noted that, since treaty fishing rights are "subject to outside
changing circumstances," the treaty right does not guarantee that de-
velopments will not '"unfortunately"' destroy the fish runs.130 Both
courts' worries were hyperbolic: their denial of the existence of treaty
property rights was therefore unnecessary. Few property rights are
absolute; most are relative.13 The treaty fishing right, as a profit d
prendre, would not block all developments, only those that "unrea-
sonably interfere" with its exercise. 132 Had both courts been better in-
formed of the nature of the applicable property law, they could have
avoided the distorted reasoning that characterized their decisions.
VI. OFF-RESERVATION RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
At the heart of his decision was Judge Wood's conclusion that the
tribe had no off-reservation water rights. 3 The result was to remove
the threat of treaty water rights for upriver Snake River irrigators -
the overwhelming majority of irrigators in the state. The result may
be good politics, but it is bad law. The court's opinion ignored several
decisions holding that off-reservation reserved water rights may exist.
According to the SRBA court, there were actually two reasons
why the Nez Perce have no water rights for their off-reservation fish-
eries: the decided cases finding that water had been reserved to pre-
serve tribal fishing rights either involved on-reservation situations, or
they did not involve a treaty promise of "fishing in common."13 4 The
court's conclusion on these points derived from a very selective read-
ing of the case law.
The SRBA court took pains to describe United States v. Adair,
1 35
which the court appeared to consider the leading case,3 6 as an on-
reservation water rights case. In Adair, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
129. Slip op., supra note 17, at 36 (citing Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co.,
847 F. Supp. 791, 808 (D. Idaho 1994)).
130. Id. at 36-37 (quoting Nez Perce Tribe, 847 F. Supp. at 814)
131. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 101 (4th ed. 1998);
See also JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 4,
129 (1st ed. 1993); RALPH E. BOYER ET AL., THE AW OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTORY
SURVEY 1 (4th ed. 1991).
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY, § 4.9 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1994)
(endorsing the "unreasonable interference" standard, the same standard articulated in
the 1944 Restatement).
133. Slip op., supra note 17, at 12, 40, 46, 47. The court deferred the on-
reservation water rights question for a later time.
134. Id. at 39.
135. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983).
136. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 40 (describing Adair as "[t]he front runner
case").
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the Kiamath Tribe possessed 'time immemorial" water rights for its
treaty hunting and fishing rights, and tied the scope of the water re-
served to implement the hunting and fishing rights to that amount
necessary to achieve a moderate living for the tribe."i 7 Adair, how-
ever, is an odd candidate for classification as an on-reservation case
because the KIamath Reservation no longer exists, having been sold
or condemned in the wake of congressional termination in 1954.138 Al-
though the reservation no longer exists, the Klamath Termination Act
expressly preserved the tribe's hunting, fishing, and water rights on
the apparent belief that those rights were not necessarily appurte-
nant to the reservation lands.'39 This congressional sentiment was ig-
nored by the SRBA court, as was the fact that when the Ninth Circuit
decided Adair in 1983, the case resembled an off-reservation case be-
cause there were no reservation lands. The court also ignored the fact
that the Supreme Court has discounted differences between off-
reservation and on-reservation fishing rights - at least when salmon
have been at stake - stating in the Passenger Fishing Vessel case
that "Is]hares in the fish runs should not be affected by the place
where the fish are taken.' 40
Another case the SRBA court sought to distinguish was Kittitas
Reclamation District v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District.' In Kit-
titas, the Ninth Circuit upheld the authority of a watermaster to take
measures designed to preserve salmon redds (nests) that would have
been dewatered by planned flow reductions from a Federal Bureau of
Reclamation dam.42 The SRBA court noted parenthetically that the
court in Kittitas did not decide the scope of the fishing right.143 Al-
though this conclusion is correct, the court ignored the following facts:
(1) the case involved the Yakama Indian Nation's "fishing in common"
treaty rights; and (2) the redds were not located on the Yakama res-
ervation. 44 Thus, both grounds Judge Wood gave for distinguishing
the case did not actually apply.
137. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414-15 (relying on Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S.
658, 686 (1979)).
138. See Klamath Termination Act of 1954 § 1, 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1994).
139. Id. § 564m; see also Adair, 723 F.2d at 1412.
140. Passenger Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 687 (overruling the trial court's
separate allocation for on-reservation and off-reservation harvests).
141. 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032 (1985).
142. See id. at 1035.
143. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 39.
144. See Electronic mail from John Ogan, formerly an attorney for the Yakama
Indian Nation, to Michael Blumm (Feb. 2, 2000) (noting that the redds located on the
Yakima River, near Easton and Cle Elum, were 60-75 miles from the reservation
boundaries).
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Two other cases which Judge Wood cited, Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton 145 and United States v. Anderson,146 involved reserva-
tions established by executive order rather than by treaty. Although
neither executive order mentioned fishing rights, the courts not only
implied fishing rights from the historic dependence of the Colville and
Spokane Tribes on salmon, they also determined that the implied
fishing rights required implied water rights. One of the decisions in-
volved water flows to establish replacement fish spawning grounds. 147
In the other, the court set a temperature standard to facilitate salmon
spawning." The SRBA court denied water rights for an express, bar-
gained-for treaty fishing right, apparently seeing nothing inconsistent
with its conclusion in these decisions - which implied reserved water
rights from implied fishing rights.
Judge Wood's attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Arizona v. California141 is also problematic. In Arizona, the
Court held that five small Indian reservations along the Colorado
River possessed reserved water rights for irrigation, measured by the
"practicably irrigable acreage" on their reservations. 50 As a result,
these five reservations, created by executive order rather than treaty,
received about one million acre-feet of water for roughly 135,000 irri-
gable acres of land1 1 - even though the executive orders said nothing
about reserving water. The SRBA court cited the case as one involving
on-reservation water rights.'52 One of the reservations, however, does
not border the Colorado River, so the source of its reserved rights was
actually off-reservation.'
Thus, the cases on which Judge Wood relied to deny the Nez
Perce off-reservation water rights claim actually stand for the follow-
ing propositions: (1) on-reservation water rights are not appurtenant
to reservations, because they can survive the termination of the res-
ervation; 5' (2) off-reservation fishing rights can affect the operation of
water projects located off-reservation;' 55 (3) reserved water rights can
145. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
146. 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
147. See Colville, 647 F.2d at 48.
148. See Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 5-6.
149. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
150. Id. at 600-01.
151. See id. at 595-96.
152. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 39.
153. The Cocopah Reservation was awarded reserved water rights in the
Court's 1964 decree in Arizona v. California. 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964). The reservation
does not, however, border on the Colorado River. See Blumm, supra note 25, §
37.01(b)(3), at 230, n.77.
154. See U.S. v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412 (9th Cir. 1983).
155. See Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763
F.2d 1032, 1035 (1985).
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be implied from implied fishing rights;'56 and (4) sources of reserved
water rights do not have to be located on-reservation.'57 Although the
express, bargained-for, off-reservation fishing rights were essential to
the Northwest tribes' signing of the treaties and enabled the United
States to obtain title to some sixty-four million acres of land, Judge
Wood ruled that they had no reserved water. This is a deduction that
an irrigation district advocate might be expected to draw, but it is
surprising when it comes from a disinterested court.
VII. THE TERMINATION OF TREATY USUFRUCTUARY RIGHTS
A final, striking element of the SRBA court's opinion was Judge
Wood's reliance on the 1998 Supreme Court decision in South Dakota
v. Yankton Sioux Tribe.'" The court concluded that an 1893 agree-
ment between the Nez Perce and the federal government authorizing
the sale of "surplus" Nez Perce reservation lands, without mentioning
fishing rights, diminished the reservation. 159 According to the court,
the agreement therefore terminated any fishing rights that might
have existed on lands previously within the reservation. 6 ' Judge
Wood thought the size of the reservation significant because he de-
nied the existence of water rights for off-reservation interests.'' To
reach this conclusion, the court had to ignore a 1999 Supreme Court
decision ruling that unmentioned off-reservation proprietary rights
survive land cessions to the federal government.'6 2 The SRBA court
again confused proprietary rights with sovereign powers.'63
In Yankton Sioux, the tribe sought to regulate the siting of a
landfill on land that had been sold to the United States as "surplus
lands" and subsequently deeded to a non-Indian under a homestead
act.' 64 The lower courts ruled that the tribe could regulate the landfill
156. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
157. See Arizona, 376 U.S. at 344.
158. 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
159. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 46 (relying on Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28
Stat. 286).
160. See id. at 41-47 (relying on Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329).
161. See id. at 41, 46.
162. See infra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part V.
164. See Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 333. Under the General Allotment Act,
(Dawes Act), Congress authorized the division of Indian reservation into separate par-
cels (allotments) for individual tribal members in order to promote agricultural pur-
suits. See Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 et
seq.) (1983)). In addition, Congress authorized the sale of non-allotted, surplus lands to
non-Indians. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1 (1995).
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
because the surplus land sale had terminated the tribe's proprietary
rights, but not its governmental authority over the land.165 The Su-
preme Court reversed, however, holding that when Congress ratified
the sale of the surplus land, it effected a diminishment of the reserva-
tion and terminated the tribe's regulatory authority over the land
sold.'66 Because the statute involved in the Yankton Sioux case also
ratified "surplus" land sales on the Nez Perce reservation, Judge
Wood thought the Supreme Court's 1998 decision controlled the Nez
Perce water claim for off-reservation fishing grounds.
16 7
The two cases involve fundamentally different issues. Yankton
Sioux concerned the tribe's sovereign authority to regulate non-Indian
land uses on what it erroneously thought was its reservation.' The
Nez Perce, on the other hand, did not seek judicial recognition of
regulatory authority, but instead sought recognition of the tribe's pro-
prietary right to fish. The SRBA court confused the two issues,
thereby failing to recognize that the controlling precedent was the
Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians.'69
In Mille Lacs, the Court determined that an off-reservation
treaty '"privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering .. . during the
pleasure of the President""7 ° survived: (1) an executive order at-
tempting to remove the tribe from the lands it ceded to the United
States;' 7 ' (2) a subsequent treaty in which the tribe agreed to relin-
quish "all right, title, and interest" in all lands in the Minnesota terri-
tory;172 and (3) Minnesota statehood. 173 The most relevant aspect of the
Mille Lacs case to the Nez Perce situation was the cession of land in
the subsequent treaty. Because that treaty made no mention of the
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights reserved in the prior treaty,
and because the tribe received no compensation for these rights, the
Court concluded that the tribe would not have understood that it was
relinquishing its reserved rights.7 4 Therefore, the Court held that the
purpose of the treaty was merely to transfer land to the United
165. See Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Southern Missouri Waste Management Dist.,
890 F. Supp. 878 (D.S.D. 1995), affd, 99 F.3d 1439 (8th Cir. 1996), reu'd sub. nom
Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329. See also Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus Lands and Land-
fills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. REV. 283 (1998).
166. See Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. 329, 358.
167. See Slip op., supra note 17, at 41-46.
168. See Yankton Sioux, 522 U.S. at 333.
169. 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
170. Id. at 177 (quoting 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa).
171. See id. at 193.
172. Id. at 195 (quoting 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa); see also id. at 202.
173. See id. at 208.
174. See id. at 184-86.
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States, not to terminate the previously reserved usufructuary
rights."7 5 In short, since the treaty's conveyance of land title did not
work an unambiguous termination of the tribe's hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights, those rights continued despite the land transfer.176
The Mille Lacs decision demonstrates that the Nez Perce water
rights - also usufructuary rights 177 - appurtenant to fishing grounds
formerly on their reservation, should be unaffected by land cessions to
the government - such as that ratified in the 1894 statute - which
do not specifically mention those rights. The fact that the Nez Perce
received monetary compensation under the 1894 statute for the sur-
plus land sale is irrelevant. The monetary compensation the Nez
Perce received was for the lands the tribe expressly conveyed, rather
than for fishing rights not mentioned in the agreement. In Mille Lacs,
the fact that the tribe received monetary compensation for its ceded
lands did not prevent the Supreme Court from concluding that the
tribe's unmentioned hunting rights survived.1
78
If anything, the Nez Perce fishing rights stand on firmer ground
than the usufructuary rights in Mille Lacs. The Nez Perce rights are
not defeasible "at the pleasure of the President," as are the Mille Lacs
off-reservation rights. 17 Instead, the off-reservation fishing rights
were intended to endure through the years. The Supreme Court de-
termined this point nearly a century ago in the Winans case, when it
held that the treaty fishing right was a servitude burdening all ceded
lands."s The Court justified that decision in language that still reso-
nates today:
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was a
part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exer-
cise of which there was not a shadow of impediment, and
175. See id. at 196.
176. See id. at 201-02.
177. See 6 THOMPSON, supra note 121, § 50.03(d), at 519-20; see also Robert E.
Beck, The Legal Regimes, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 4.01, at 65 (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1991).
178. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 180 (noting the compensation for the ceded lands).
The court also stated:
The entire 1855 Treaty, in fact, is devoid of any language expressly men-
tioning - much less abrogating - usufructuary rights. Similarly, the Treaty
contains no language providing money for the abrogation of previously held
rights. These omissions are telling because the United States treaty drafters
had the sophistication and experience to use express language for the abroga-
tion of treaty rights.
Id. at 195.
179. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
180. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
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which were not much less necessary to the existence of the
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed. New conditions
came into existence, to which those rights had to be accommo-
dated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and
intended, not a taking away. In other words, the treaty was
not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right from
them - a reservation of those not granted.""
Whatever adjustments might be necessary to accommodate the Nez
Perce Tribe's reserved off-reservation fishing rights to the conditions
of the 21st century, the accommodation cannot involve denying the
existence of water rights necessary to effectuate the fishing purpose of
their century-and-half old treaty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In 1983, in a decision that sanctioned state court determination
of the existence, nature, and scope of Indian reserved water rights
under the McCarran Amendment, Justice Brennan expressed opti-
mism that the state courts would deal fairly with Indian water right
claims. Justice Brennan noted that "our decision in no way changes
the substantive law by which Indian rights in state water adjudica-
tions must be judged. State courts, as much as federal courts, have a
solemn obligation to follow federal, law."" 2 The SRBA court's decision
casts doubt on Justice Brennan's optimism about the justice that
tribal water rights would receive in state courts.
If the 19th and early 20th century was an era in which tribes lost
most of their lands through treaties and statutes like the Dawes Act,
the 21st century may become the era in which the tribes lose their
most precious remaining resource - their water rights - to state
courts under the McCarran Amendment. The Idaho Supreme Court
has the opportunity to prevent that era from beginning in Idaho by
correcting the errors in the SRBA court's misguided opinion."' 3
IX. EPILOGUE
When we wrote that Judge Wood's opinion read more like an
advocate's brief than a dispassionate judicial opinion," we had no idea
181. Id. at 380-81.
182. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
183. The Idaho Supreme Court might take note of the Arizona Supreme
Court's example in In re Gila River System & Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Az. 1999), where
the court ruled that tribal water rights could include groundwater, expressly rejecting
the Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in In re Big Horn System, 753 P.2d 76, 99-100
(Wyo. 1988).
184. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 36
2000] JUDICIAL TERMINATION OF TREATY WATER 475
RIGHTS
how close to the mark we were. In February, 2000, a little over two
months after Judge Wood's initial opinion rejecting the Nez Perce
Tribe's off-reservation water right claims, the tribe asked Judge Wood
to disqualify himself because both he and members of his family were in
fact parties to the SRBA proceeding.'" Judge Wood has groundwater
claims for domestic uses and irrigation of thirteen acres.'" His brother
and two sisters also have water right claims subject to the SRBA; one
sibling irrigates 62.8 acres. 87 His sister and brother-in-law also are
members of a partnership which has irrigation and domestic claims at
issue in the SRBA, and his brother-in-law is a shareholder in a
corporation with domestic, power, and irrigation claims.'"
Judge Wood disclosed none of these conflicts to the parties in the
case until February 11, 2000 - four days after the tribe asked him to
disqualify himself and roughly two and one-half months after his
decision. 8 9 He had, however, apparently mentioned his water right
claim to the Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court before he was
appointed presiding judge of the SRBA court.'90
Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge may be
disqualified for cause if the judge-'"is a party, or is interested in the
action or proceeding,"' or because the judge "is related to either party
by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree... .""' The tribe
alleged that Judge Wood should have disqualified himself either
because of his or his family's water right claims.1
In 1989, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recused herself from
Wyoming v. United States," a case involving a basinwide adjudication
to water rights of the Big Horn River Basin, when she discovered that
her family's ranch, in which she was a minority stockholder, was party
to an Indian water rights adjudication in Arizona. She disqualified
185. See Response to United States Motion For Status Conference and Order on
Nez Perce Tribe's Motion To Set Aside All Decisions. . . and Motion to Disqualify Judge
Wood at 3, In re SRBA, No. 39576, Subcase No. 03-10022, (Idaho Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 2000)
[hereinafter Refusal to Disqualify] (citing the tribe's motion to disqualify, filed on Feb. 7,
2000).
186. See id. at 17-18.
187. See id. at 19-20.
188. See id. at 21.
189. See id. at 3-4 (citing Judge Wood's disclosure of February 11, 2000 and a
supplemental disclosure of February 28, 2000).
190. See Associated Press, Water rights judge responds to tribe, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Feb. 18, 2000, at 10B (noting Judge Wood's claim that he discussed his water
rights with Chief Justice Linda Copple Trout on Nov. 3, 1998).
191. See Refusal to Disqualify, supra note 185, at 9 (quoting IDAHO R. CIV. P. §
40(d)(2)(A)(1)-(2)).
192. See id. at 9-10.
193. 492 U.S. 406 (1989)
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herself even though the case had been fully briefed and argued and the
Justices had exchanged numerous draft opinions, and even though, as
revealed by Justice Marshall's papers, Justice O'Connor was about to
deliver a majority opinion in the case.'9 Her memorandum to the Court
stated, '"For reasons which I will not detail here, I believe the ranch will
succeed in being dismissed from the suit as having no affected interest,
but as of now I believe I must disqualify myself in this case."' 195
Recently, the several members of the Arizona Supreme Court followed
Justice O'Connor's example and recused themselves from the Gila River
adjudication."
Judge Wood chose not to follow the examples of Justice O'Connor
or the Arizona Supreme Court. Instead, on March 23, 2000, he rejected
the tribe's motion to disqualify him, ruling that there was no direct
conflict between his and his family's claims and those of the tribe and
that any conflicts were 'Indirect, speculative and, at best, de
minimus."' 97 Judge Wood determined that there were no direct conflicts
because his family's claims had been the subject of partial decrees
issued by Judge Wood's predecessor, had not been challenged by the
tribe, or had not as yet been reported by the Idaho Water Resources
Department. 8 As for his own water right claims, Judge Wood opined
that there was essentially no difference between his claim for domestic
use and every other landowner served by a municipality within the area
subject to the SRBA court's jurisdiction - eighty-seven percent of the
state.199 Thus, his stockwatering claim was, according to Judge Wood, de
minimus.'0 And since his irrigation claim will not be reported until
sometime in 2003, the judge ruled that any conflicts with the tribe were
"remote and speculative.'20 1
Judge Wood added that there could only be a conflict between the
tribe's claims and his own and his family's if there were a water
shortage, if his own groundwater claims were actually hydrologically
connected with the tribe's claims, and if a delivery call of
"unprecedented magnitude" were made.21 2 Fundamentally, the court
determined that his and his family's claims were just too small to make
194. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectiv-
ism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1640-41 & nn.327-28
(1996); Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions
in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 683, 684-85 & n.10 (1997).
195. Mergen & Liu, supra note 194, at 685 n.10 (quoting Justice O'Connor).
196. See supra note 183.
197. Refusal to Disqualify, supra note 185, at 27-33.
198. See id. at 28, 32.
199. See id. at 28-29.
200. See id. at 28.
201. Id. at 32.
202. Id. at 35-37.
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a difference:
[I]n the overall scope of the SRBA, Judge Wood's claims, and
the claims of his family members, are inconsequential....
[T]he SRBA encompasses more than three million acres of ir-
rigated land. Judge Wood's irrigation right for ten acres rep-
resents a tiny fraction of the total irrigation claims. Surely
this interest is de minimus. In sum, the speculative nature
and indirectness of any perceived conflict is not sufficient
grounds for disqualification.2 °0
Judge Wood should have instead followed the precedents set by
Justice O'Connor and the Arizona Supreme Court. Even if he is right
that his and his family's claims are de minimus, faith in the
impartiality of the judiciary depends not on technical definitions of
direct versus indirect conflicts but on avoiding the appearance of
unfairness. Judge Wood did not avoid this appearance. Since there is no
exception in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for de minimus
conflicts, 20 4 the Idaho Supreme Court should overrule Judge Wood,
disqualify him, and void his unfortunate decision on the merits.
203. Id. at 37.
204. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.

